Foucault makes the point that "repression" (the notion of repression) simply acts as an incitement to creating a discourse on sexuality. But, as he expresses in his first doubt concerning this hypothesis, he is still uncertain whether we are, in fact, repressed. He cites certain "refinements" of language that are made which do not truly repress, but just act as a guise of repression, in order that we might actually speak of sex more easily (?). This seems dismissive. Where are these "refinements" coming from? Are they not perhaps part of the actual, historical repression that he is wondering about? And if so, considering that all power for Foucault is positive and prompts rather than denies, what are the power structures that cause this actual repression? This comment takes nothing away from his hypothesis, really, because his hypothesis can most certainly include these indications of actual, historical repression. But there are, perhaps, more powers at play concerning sexuality than he makes apparent.
Take, for example, the expunging of graphic language from the Catholic confessional. He cites this as certain, and quotes Alfonso de'Liguori in saying that when talking to children, only "roundabout and vague" questions should be asked. This cleansing of language, if it is to be taken as executed by the same powers that are causing this explosion of sexual discourse, must necessarily be tied to the ease and frequency with which we talk about sex. This refinement of language must cause a better, easier way of discussing sex to come about, otherwise it can be considered negative, and we could be considered actually repressed, and the hypothesis that the power is acting to prompt sexual discourse is not as strong. So, this apparent restriction in cleansing language must be considered tied to the extension of the bounds of sexual discourse, and in fact partially causing the increase in the discussion of sex in other areas (e.g. the extension of confessional practices beyond action and into intention and psychology).
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3 comments:
I buy your overall argument, but I do have one problems with your analysis.
I think you're misinterpreting Foucault's first doubt. He labels it as historical in nature, and my understanding is that he's asking 'is repression actually a historical event'? i.e. was there a shift in society between the 17th and 18th centuries in which western civilization went from a state of being open about individual sexuality to a state of intolerance towards -and denial of- individual sexuality. And, while I did initially get the impression that Foucault doubted whether or not we were in fact repressed he makes it explicit that this is not so. Foucault writes, with particular relevance to his first doubt,
"I do not maintain that the prohibition of sex is a ruse; but it is a ruse to make prohibition into the basic and constitutive element from which one would be able to write the history of what has been said concerning sex starting from the modern epoch" (The Foucault Reader 300). So he's leaving the idea of "are we repressed?" alone, and not addressing it directly.
The quote that Bogdan gives at the end there from Foucault has Foucault saying he rejects prohibition (ie repression) as the central or basic mechanism of power, not its rejection wholesale.
Your question I think is: does he stretch it?
I think part of the answer is that Foucault's broader choice (not just in relation to sexuality) to focus on what power makes possible rather than what it does not is not so much about what he has "discovered", historically or empirically, about how power works, but is a methodological choice that will be justified by what it in turn makes visible to us.
In other words, and I don't want to sound tautological, Foucault believes that it is more productive to see power as productive: that we learn more about how power works by looking at what it does rather than what it forbids.
In the case of sexuality, he thinks that while "repression" may accurately describe aspects or effects of the change in attitude to sex, what is more characteristic overall is more talk about sex. And this is something he tries to justify by reference to historical/empirical facts - well or badly.
But there is I think, as I suggest, a broader methodological choice that I don't think can ultimately be justified - or refuted - empirically because it is rather a framework or axiom for considering evidence, and is to be judged rather by its effects.
Professor, I think you understand my point quite well. The question really is whether or not Foucault brushes over the possible actuality of repression in order to move on to his thesis on the productive nature of power. Ultimately yes, as part of Foucault's critical standpoint, it is better to view power as positive, but that does not rule out the possibility of repression as a historical fact or trend. In saying "I do not maintain that the prohibition of sex is a ruse;" Foucault does leave the question alone, but his lack of a stance on this point goes hand in hand with his brushing past the evidence of actual repression. Really, this quote that you (bogdan) present is representative of his hypothesis of power being positive. It is a microcosm of his method of historical analysis. He bypasses certain things (possible factoids pointing to actual repression) in order that he might focus on the more important thesis (repression as a ruse that drives discourse). And, as you said, Professor, this is only a move that can be shown to be valid or invalid after his full argument has been made. It cannot necessarily be disproved by the empirical data presented in the beginning of the essay.
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