The Hermeneutics of the Subject
· Reminder of the general problematic: subjectivity and truth:
Foucault had examined the relation of subjectivity and truth from a privileged example, that of the aphrodisia. Foucault claims that it was this regimen of the aphrodisia that served as the framework for much of European sexual morality, not Judeo-Christian morality (the reason for this will be made clear shortly). But, he now wants to examine less historically and more generally the question: In what form do relations between the subject and truth take shape?
· New theoretical point of departure: the care of the self:
The translation of the Greek epimeleia heautou. The care of the self. Taking this notion as a point of departure seems a bit surprising when we are more familiar with the notion of gnothi seauton, or "know yourself." So, Foucault proposes to examine the relation between the apparently marginalized notion of "the care of the self" and the notion which seems so important to the relation between the subject and truth, "know yourself."
· Interpretations of the Delphic precept "know yourself":
Foucault claims that the precept "know yourself" did not have the philosophical meaning that we give it today. It did not prescribe self-knowledge, "neither as the basis of morality, nor as part of a relationship with the gods." Instead, Foucault refers to different interpretations of the Delphic precepts in the cult of Apollo. One suggested interpretation is that it referred to "knowing yourself" when consulting the oracle, so you knew which questions you wanted to ask, as a matter of efficiency. Regardless of which interpretation of the "know yourself" is proper, Foucault is attempting to downplay it as a philosophical maxim, and he pushes forward in order to discuss how whenever the "know yourself" is discussed in classical philosophy, it is "coupled" or "twinned" with the exhortation for "the care of the self." In fact, as Foucault will further argue (this is the direction of Foucault's whole argument), the precept "know yourself" is subordinated to the idea of "the care of the self." He claims that "know yourself" appears as a particular application of the more general rule, that of "the care of the self".
· Socrates as man of care of the self: analysis of three extracts from the Apology:
In the first passage, Foucault highlights that Socrates exhorts Athenians to "attend to themselves." Socrates claims that Athenians attend to their "wealth, reputation and honors" but do not attend to their "reason, truth and the constant improvement of [their] soul[s]." So here he shows Socrates as the first proponent of the precept of the "care of the self" over and above simply "knowledge of the self". Socrates also shows this mission of exhorting Athenians to be attentive to themselves to be entrusted to him by the Gods. This is highlighted by Foucault. Socrates, in helping others care for themselves, will neglect a range of activities that are though to be self-interested. This notion of the care of the self is one that must be looked at as an awakening. This notion of the care of the self should be like a thorn in one's side-- like a continuous concern throughout life.
· Care of the self as precept of ancient philosophical and moral life:
Foucault does not simply want to say that "know yourself" is a particular instantiation of "the care of the self". Rather, he argues that "the care of the self" is a precept that pervades ancient philosophical thought. He cites a phrase from Epicurus, saying that "Every man should take care of his soul day and night and throughout his life." Foucault cites several other examples of the use of this precept in ancient philosophy, and then goes on to say that "the care of the self" is the condition for all access to philosophical though. Not only this, but it is really the principle of all moral rationality, in regard to Greco-roman thought.
· Care of the self in the first Christian texts:
Foucault equates the care of the self with a form of asceticism, although not the necessarily self-renunciatory form often thought of in conjunction with Christianity. He likens it more to a discipline of the self, focusing on the self, and tempering the self, but not in a negative form. Foucault claims that the ascetic life begins with the care of the self (perhaps through the tenuous link given by his analysis of Gregory of Nyssa's statement).
· Care of the self as a general standpoint, relationship to the self and set of practices:
Foucault here presents three points, exactly as above listed. The care of the self is first, a general way of looking at things. It is an "attitude towards the self, others, and the world". Second, the care of the self is a relation to oneself where one looks away from the outside. Not necessarily toward the inside, but definitely away from the outside. Third, this notion brings with it a set of practices exercised by the self on the self by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures oneself.
However, the question still remains, why is it that the West neglected the notion of the care of the self in reconstructing its own history, considering that it has just been demonstrated to be a prevalent thought in ancient and early Christian movements, and perhaps even encompass the precept of self-knowledge?
· Reasons for the modern elimination of care of the self in favor of self-knowledge: modern morality; the Cartesian moment:
The notion of the "care of the self" seems like a challenge to our modern morality. It cannot help but be portrayed negatively. There are movements (presumably Christianity) in which all elevation of the self is decried. Viewed in this light, the light of modern morality, this "withdrawing into oneself" or "caring for oneself" seems like something that one could only practice given the disintegration of a collective morality onto which one could grasp.
However, in ancient philosophy and early Christianity, both movements where this precept has been shown to have had so much sway, it was undoubtedly portrayed positively. This forms something of a paradox, because so much of modern christianity, which would view this precept as negative, stemmed from early christianity, where this injunction to "take care of oneself" was viewed positively. A further paradox can be established after this. This precept, which in modern morality signifies either egoism or withdrawal, actually originated as a positive principle, and from it many exceedingly strict moralities have been derived. Furthermore, the principle of the care of the self was overshadowed by the strict rules which it engendered, which have been "taken up again" by us in a context of "non-egoism," whether in the Christian obligation of self-renunciation or in the modern obligation towards others. This is really the greatest paradox, that Christianity has developed strict moral codes in an environment of non-egoism, but really, the codes themselves were born "within an environment strongly marked by the obligation to take care of oneself."
Foucault posits a reason that he claims is more fundamental than these paradoxes for the overlooking of the care of the self in favor of "self-knowledge". This reason is what Foucault calls the "Cartesian moment" (inverted commas are his, not mine). He claims that this "Cartesian moment" functions to cause this "forgetting" of the care of the self in 2 ways. First of all, it requalifies the notion of self-knowledge. The "Cartesian moment" "placed self-evidence at the origin, the point of departure of the philosophical approach-- self-evidence as it appears, that is to say as it is given, as it is actually given to consciousness without any possible doubt." "This knowledge of oneself made the "know yourself" into a fundamental means of access to truth." In making the "know yourself" into a fundamental means of access to truth, the "Cartesian moment" simultaneously disqualified the notion of the care of the self.
· Philosophy and Spirituality
Foucault then goes on to define Philosophy and Spirituality as counterparts, Philosophy designating whether there is a truth, and the extent to which the subject can have access to that truth, and spirituality designating the process (of change) the subject must undergo in order to access that truth.
Foucault defines Western spirituality as having three characteristics:
First: Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right. Truth is never given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge.
Second: "Eros and askesis are the two major forms in Western spirituality for conceptualizing the modalities by which the subject must be transformed in order finally to become capable of truth.
Third: An act of knowledge could never give access to the truth unless it was prepared, accompanied, doubled, and completed by a certain transformation of the subject; not of the individual, but of the subject himself in his being as subject.
So, Western spirituality postulates that some transformation is indeed necessary for the subject to gain access to the truth, because it is never given it by right, or simply through an act of knowledge (with the exception of gnosis). Primarily through Eros and Askesis, the subject is transformed, either moved or worked upon, in order that he might have access to truth. Finally, when the subject does have access to truth, when it has arrived at its telos, there is final transformation that truth enacts on the subject that fulfills and transfigures his very being.
The modern age, or perhaps the modern age of the history of truth, consists in a period when knowledge and knowledge alone gives access to the truth. Thus, there are new conditions on the access to truth, but they do not fall under the category of spirituality, because no transformation of the subject is required under them. The first set of conditions are the conditions of knowledge, they are the conditions of knowing. The second set of conditions is extrinsic to the subject. They are cultural and moral conditions. These conditions, however, do not concern the subject, but only the individual in his concrete existence.
Thus the new truth is really the pursuit of truth. The subject will only be fulfilled in the process of searching for truth, in the proliferation of knowledge itself. In the modern age of the history of truth, truth no longer completes the subject. Truth cannot save the subject. The modern age of relations between the subject and truth begin when we postulate that the subject, as he is, can have access to truth, but truth cannot save the subject.
· Presence of conflicting requirements of spirituality: science and theology before Descartes; classical and modern philosophy; Marxism and psychoanalysis:
Foucault runs over into the second half of the lecture. There are still a few more reasons for the disappearance of the notion of “the care of the self” from philosophical thought and concern. There was a break between how the subject has access to truth, as was just mentioned. Truth is, in its modern conception, accessed through a simple act of knowledge, not through the care of the self, which can be viewed as spirituality the transformations therein. This break is not a decisive one, but rather a slow one. What constituted the main wedge in this split, rather than the assumed science, was theology. Theology first created the idea of a knowing subject whose goal, model, and Creator was God. This theology, which can give access to truth through an act of knowing, clashes with the idea of a spirituality where the subject must be transformed in order to have access to truth.
Foucault claims that 19th century philosophy was a resurgence in the idea of spiritual requirements for knowing. He cites Spinoza in saying that there needs to be a transformation of the understanding even in acts of knowing. Foucault also cites 2 main examples of practices where there is seemingly no transformation required, but actually spirituality is necessary for knowledge. These examples are Marxism and psychoanalysis.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Response: Philosophy and Psychology
That is precisely the point of the chapters we read in the Order of Things, that the human sciences, being so new, employing normative methods, and also being purely empirical, have yet to plant themselves on any firm footing. They claim to make some definitive statements about man in his essence, but really have only provided analysis of him as he is constituted, and not a bit of information as to how he has been constituted. Philosophy, in this case, being derived from primarily rational grounds, along with empirical justification, can be viewed as self-sustaining. Its questions are questions which Psychology cannot fully address. Granted, in retrospect, dealing with my mapping of interpreter and grammarian onto philosopher and psychologist, I am not sure that I was correct, but it was a purely preliminary reading, and after reading the Order of Things, my knowledge of the subject is somewhat fuller. But, as regards philosophy and psychology, that is precisely what is at issue. Psychology cannot legitimate itself, and neither can any of the Human Sciences. The question of legitimization may be a dubious one at best anyway, and perhaps not relevant, but the point is that Philosophy and Psychology are placed, by nature, in some sort of dichotomy, one proceeding from principles and the other as purely empirical.
Tuesday, February 6, 2007
Philosophy and Psychology
When Foucault discusses Freud, he speaks of having the "absolute ground for a possible hermeneutic." He then claims that Freud is an exegete and not semiologist. It would seem to me that Foucault's diagnosis of Freud is very aptly appropriated by me and made to fit my opinion on the opposition of Philosophy and Psychology.
By semiologist, Foucault means someone who understands, on the highest possible level, the rules that govern the way signs convey meaning. This does not seem like a hermeneutic. It seems more akin to the "absolute ground for a hermeneutic," which is quite possibly why Foucault contrasts Freud with the semiologist, and the absolute ground with Freud's project, which is a hermeneutic. So, one could, for the sake of argument, view Psychology as a hermeneutic, and in being so, perhaps being a second order study, and then map Philosophy onto semiology, or if not precisely onto semiology, at least onto the knowledge of the absolute ground for the possibility of a hermeneutic.
This may seem like a strange mapping, but upon further examination, it may prove to be a very good one. Foucault posits that the human sciences are merely a moment in the destiny of Western philosophy. Through the addition of the unconscious, psychology has been appropriating the territory of the human sciences, and through this addition, attempting to add normative force to its discoveries. This normative aspect begins the part of psychology that attempts to be more than a hermeneutic. It is attempting to move into the territory of philosophy in studying the qualities of man through a hermeneutic. It is not possible to come to the absolute ground for the possibility of a hermeneutic through the hermeneutic itself. Thus, when one looks at the normative thrust of psychology, one must disallow it, and look at what really grounds the study of the individual, which is philosophy. So, the distinction between interpreter and grammarian can be loosely mapped onto the distinction between psychology and philosophy, and hopefully it can be realized that this normative force which psychology exerts is precisely causing this anthropological slumber that Foucault speaks of. It is the illegitimate attempt of the human sciences, through psychology, which poses as the study of the individual, to constitute their own ground, that causes this anthropological slumber.
By semiologist, Foucault means someone who understands, on the highest possible level, the rules that govern the way signs convey meaning. This does not seem like a hermeneutic. It seems more akin to the "absolute ground for a hermeneutic," which is quite possibly why Foucault contrasts Freud with the semiologist, and the absolute ground with Freud's project, which is a hermeneutic. So, one could, for the sake of argument, view Psychology as a hermeneutic, and in being so, perhaps being a second order study, and then map Philosophy onto semiology, or if not precisely onto semiology, at least onto the knowledge of the absolute ground for the possibility of a hermeneutic.
This may seem like a strange mapping, but upon further examination, it may prove to be a very good one. Foucault posits that the human sciences are merely a moment in the destiny of Western philosophy. Through the addition of the unconscious, psychology has been appropriating the territory of the human sciences, and through this addition, attempting to add normative force to its discoveries. This normative aspect begins the part of psychology that attempts to be more than a hermeneutic. It is attempting to move into the territory of philosophy in studying the qualities of man through a hermeneutic. It is not possible to come to the absolute ground for the possibility of a hermeneutic through the hermeneutic itself. Thus, when one looks at the normative thrust of psychology, one must disallow it, and look at what really grounds the study of the individual, which is philosophy. So, the distinction between interpreter and grammarian can be loosely mapped onto the distinction between psychology and philosophy, and hopefully it can be realized that this normative force which psychology exerts is precisely causing this anthropological slumber that Foucault speaks of. It is the illegitimate attempt of the human sciences, through psychology, which poses as the study of the individual, to constitute their own ground, that causes this anthropological slumber.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007
Governmentality and Foucault's method
Foucault's genealogies of different topics in relation to his overall theory of power as positive are remarkably consistent. Foucault, in each article, and in relation to whatever historical subject he reviews, claims that there is a shift from an older, perhaps simpler, structure of power, to a new, more complex and productive structure. This is evident in his genealogy of "Governmentality," as well as in his concept of Bio-power, and its relation to sex. Of course, none of these topics are independent. In the evolution of power structures from ones that are simple and perhaps negative to ones that employ tactics and norms, the central focus can be seen as the population. The population is the focus and the source of all norms, statistics, and studies. In each of Foucault's critical reviews of historical topics, the transformation of people from subjects to citizens, and accordingly from members of a principality to a population, is the primary means by which power is transformed, or perhaps transforms itself.
This is made explicit in the reading on Governmentality. Foucault's thoughts on punishment as well as his thoughts on sex as structures of power can be encompassed by the transition from the principality to the state. Instead of subjects, people occupying a territory are now citizens, and are able to be controlled, studied, and normalized. The shift in the types of punishment used is concurrent with the shift in the type of government. As sovereignty transitioned towards its positive counterpart, namely, the art of governing, punishment also became institutionalized. As the sovereign's hold on the principality lessened, so did his power over the body, and thus the need for public executions as a symbol of this power. In both situations, there is an abstraction from the simplest level of control, from the body. People were no longer subjects whose lives could be taken away, but now they were citizens who could be controlled through norms, and the sovereign's transition from solely ruling to "administering" called for a different type of punishment. Like I said, the onset of these two phenomena are concurrent, and must be viewed as comprising one overall shift in the technology of power, and Foucault is just addressing two different discourses.
All this is nothing novel. Foucault is aware of this, and is obviously striving for this consistency. In striving quite as much as he does, it seems he may stretch it just a bit. Foucault claims that the end of sovereignty is "internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in the shape of its laws." He contrasts this with the end of government, which, he says "resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes it directs." Foucault comes to this conclusion through his interpretation of what "the common good" refers to for the sovereign. He claims that the common good is internal to sovereignty, specifically, that it consists solely of the citizens obeying the laws, and accomplishing what is set out for them. This interpretation may be valid, but the dissociation Foucault presents between this putative "common good" and the "administration" of government does not seem to be as distinct as he would like. The common good that is the end of sovereignty implies the majority of the ends of government, namely "that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, and so on" (Governmentality, p. 211). These things that La Perrière cites as the ends of Government are already the ends of sovereignty, although the focus may perhaps be different. So, in having this shift in actuality already be implicit, the most Foucault can posit is a change in focus. Government focuses on production whereas sovereignty focused on subjects' obedience to the law. Perhaps this is just a small gripe, but the distinction seems smaller than Foucault would have it. The ends of sovereignty include the ends of government.
This is made explicit in the reading on Governmentality. Foucault's thoughts on punishment as well as his thoughts on sex as structures of power can be encompassed by the transition from the principality to the state. Instead of subjects, people occupying a territory are now citizens, and are able to be controlled, studied, and normalized. The shift in the types of punishment used is concurrent with the shift in the type of government. As sovereignty transitioned towards its positive counterpart, namely, the art of governing, punishment also became institutionalized. As the sovereign's hold on the principality lessened, so did his power over the body, and thus the need for public executions as a symbol of this power. In both situations, there is an abstraction from the simplest level of control, from the body. People were no longer subjects whose lives could be taken away, but now they were citizens who could be controlled through norms, and the sovereign's transition from solely ruling to "administering" called for a different type of punishment. Like I said, the onset of these two phenomena are concurrent, and must be viewed as comprising one overall shift in the technology of power, and Foucault is just addressing two different discourses.
All this is nothing novel. Foucault is aware of this, and is obviously striving for this consistency. In striving quite as much as he does, it seems he may stretch it just a bit. Foucault claims that the end of sovereignty is "internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in the shape of its laws." He contrasts this with the end of government, which, he says "resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes it directs." Foucault comes to this conclusion through his interpretation of what "the common good" refers to for the sovereign. He claims that the common good is internal to sovereignty, specifically, that it consists solely of the citizens obeying the laws, and accomplishing what is set out for them. This interpretation may be valid, but the dissociation Foucault presents between this putative "common good" and the "administration" of government does not seem to be as distinct as he would like. The common good that is the end of sovereignty implies the majority of the ends of government, namely "that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, and so on" (Governmentality, p. 211). These things that La Perrière cites as the ends of Government are already the ends of sovereignty, although the focus may perhaps be different. So, in having this shift in actuality already be implicit, the most Foucault can posit is a change in focus. Government focuses on production whereas sovereignty focused on subjects' obedience to the law. Perhaps this is just a small gripe, but the distinction seems smaller than Foucault would have it. The ends of sovereignty include the ends of government.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
The Body of the Condemned
Foucault's inversion of the cause for the transformation of punishment is quite brilliant. Instead of punishment's object progressing from the body to the soul for humanitarian reasons, it is simply due to the nature of punishment as a technology of power. Power produces knowledge, so it is by this method that the soul is invented/created. Foucault calls the punishment of the soul "expansionist." It is so in that the punishment of the soul creates a whole body of knowledge, a "scientia," around which psychoanalysis and other psycho-medical practices can converge. The soul is an object and a creation of science, and has become so through the judicial process.
The means by which science has dissociated punishment from the crime itself is through the crossover from act to intention, and accordingly, from punishment of the body to that of the soul. Punishment no longer has any real connection to crimes as they occur on their own. In judgment, the collective jury treats the man. We extrapolate from his crime and his character what needs to be done for him, not to him. By the collective jury, I here mean what Foucault talked about when he said that there is much outside help in judging an offender. Psychiatrists are called on so that we might understand the criminal's possible insanity, and judge him accordingly. The devolution of the implication of the code of insanity from one of there being no crime to one where there are gradations of guilt according to the degree of madness is the focal point of Foucault's enmeshment of the penal and psychiatric systems. These gradations imply much more than a diagnosis of insanity or non-insanity at the time of the offense. Rather, as Foucault somewhat vaguely claims, the gradations themselves directly imply the judgment of the soul at all times, along with its potential for danger and rehabilitation (p. 20).
This reading is overtly Nietzschean. Nietzsche criticized "punishment" in itself as counter to the individual economy of justice. It was contrary to the power in master morality, and a formation of the power of the slaves. The institutionalization of punishment removed the individual debts that resulted from every "crime," and made offenses inherently wrong. Nietzsche claims that punishment is a contrivance and an inversion, in that it is a method and power structure of slave morality. Here Foucault echoes Nietzsche insofar as he claims that punishment is being removed from the crime itself, and is dealing more and more with the intention, not the act. Intentionality, for Nietzsche, is also a characteristic of the slaves. The masters do not analyze themselves intentionally. They act, and the act is the beginning and end of any "crime" ("offense" is the proper word in Nietzsche's case). Intention is a contrivance of the slaves, and is created/appropriated in order to create bad conscience and guilt. Nietzsche's economy of the body sees debts paid in flesh. This is precisely what Foucault is claiming no longer happens. Debts are now paid by the soul. The soul is an invention/creation of the "psychologico-judicial" system, which can be viewed as analogous to Nietzsche's slaves. Since the creation of the soul by the judicial system is an act of power/knowledge, in order to maintain the analogy between Foucault and Nietzsche, we must look at the transition of power from the masters to the slaves through tools such as intentionality and guilt. Nietzsche does not have the thesis of power/knowledge, so there is a bit of a dissociation, but the basic analogy holds. So Foucault in this case is a reinterpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy applied to the modern psychologico-judicial system.
The means by which science has dissociated punishment from the crime itself is through the crossover from act to intention, and accordingly, from punishment of the body to that of the soul. Punishment no longer has any real connection to crimes as they occur on their own. In judgment, the collective jury treats the man. We extrapolate from his crime and his character what needs to be done for him, not to him. By the collective jury, I here mean what Foucault talked about when he said that there is much outside help in judging an offender. Psychiatrists are called on so that we might understand the criminal's possible insanity, and judge him accordingly. The devolution of the implication of the code of insanity from one of there being no crime to one where there are gradations of guilt according to the degree of madness is the focal point of Foucault's enmeshment of the penal and psychiatric systems. These gradations imply much more than a diagnosis of insanity or non-insanity at the time of the offense. Rather, as Foucault somewhat vaguely claims, the gradations themselves directly imply the judgment of the soul at all times, along with its potential for danger and rehabilitation (p. 20).
This reading is overtly Nietzschean. Nietzsche criticized "punishment" in itself as counter to the individual economy of justice. It was contrary to the power in master morality, and a formation of the power of the slaves. The institutionalization of punishment removed the individual debts that resulted from every "crime," and made offenses inherently wrong. Nietzsche claims that punishment is a contrivance and an inversion, in that it is a method and power structure of slave morality. Here Foucault echoes Nietzsche insofar as he claims that punishment is being removed from the crime itself, and is dealing more and more with the intention, not the act. Intentionality, for Nietzsche, is also a characteristic of the slaves. The masters do not analyze themselves intentionally. They act, and the act is the beginning and end of any "crime" ("offense" is the proper word in Nietzsche's case). Intention is a contrivance of the slaves, and is created/appropriated in order to create bad conscience and guilt. Nietzsche's economy of the body sees debts paid in flesh. This is precisely what Foucault is claiming no longer happens. Debts are now paid by the soul. The soul is an invention/creation of the "psychologico-judicial" system, which can be viewed as analogous to Nietzsche's slaves. Since the creation of the soul by the judicial system is an act of power/knowledge, in order to maintain the analogy between Foucault and Nietzsche, we must look at the transition of power from the masters to the slaves through tools such as intentionality and guilt. Nietzsche does not have the thesis of power/knowledge, so there is a bit of a dissociation, but the basic analogy holds. So Foucault in this case is a reinterpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy applied to the modern psychologico-judicial system.
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
Foucault's first doubt concerning the "repressive" hypothesis
Foucault makes the point that "repression" (the notion of repression) simply acts as an incitement to creating a discourse on sexuality. But, as he expresses in his first doubt concerning this hypothesis, he is still uncertain whether we are, in fact, repressed. He cites certain "refinements" of language that are made which do not truly repress, but just act as a guise of repression, in order that we might actually speak of sex more easily (?). This seems dismissive. Where are these "refinements" coming from? Are they not perhaps part of the actual, historical repression that he is wondering about? And if so, considering that all power for Foucault is positive and prompts rather than denies, what are the power structures that cause this actual repression? This comment takes nothing away from his hypothesis, really, because his hypothesis can most certainly include these indications of actual, historical repression. But there are, perhaps, more powers at play concerning sexuality than he makes apparent.
Take, for example, the expunging of graphic language from the Catholic confessional. He cites this as certain, and quotes Alfonso de'Liguori in saying that when talking to children, only "roundabout and vague" questions should be asked. This cleansing of language, if it is to be taken as executed by the same powers that are causing this explosion of sexual discourse, must necessarily be tied to the ease and frequency with which we talk about sex. This refinement of language must cause a better, easier way of discussing sex to come about, otherwise it can be considered negative, and we could be considered actually repressed, and the hypothesis that the power is acting to prompt sexual discourse is not as strong. So, this apparent restriction in cleansing language must be considered tied to the extension of the bounds of sexual discourse, and in fact partially causing the increase in the discussion of sex in other areas (e.g. the extension of confessional practices beyond action and into intention and psychology).
Take, for example, the expunging of graphic language from the Catholic confessional. He cites this as certain, and quotes Alfonso de'Liguori in saying that when talking to children, only "roundabout and vague" questions should be asked. This cleansing of language, if it is to be taken as executed by the same powers that are causing this explosion of sexual discourse, must necessarily be tied to the ease and frequency with which we talk about sex. This refinement of language must cause a better, easier way of discussing sex to come about, otherwise it can be considered negative, and we could be considered actually repressed, and the hypothesis that the power is acting to prompt sexual discourse is not as strong. So, this apparent restriction in cleansing language must be considered tied to the extension of the bounds of sexual discourse, and in fact partially causing the increase in the discussion of sex in other areas (e.g. the extension of confessional practices beyond action and into intention and psychology).
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